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Major depression (MD) is a highly heterogeneous diagnostic category. Diverse
symptoms such as sad mood, anhedonia, and fatigue are routinely added to an
unweighted sum-score, and cutoffs are used to distinguish between depressed
participants and healthy controls. Researchers then investigate outcome variables like
MD risk factors, biomarkers, and treatment response in such samples. These practices
presuppose that (1) depression is a discrete condition, and that (2) symptoms are
interchangeable indicators of this latent disorder. Here I review these two assumptions,
elucidate their historical roots, show how deeply engrained they are in psychological and
psychiatric research, and document that they contrast with evidence. Depression is not
a consistent syndrome with clearly demarcated boundaries, and depression symptoms
are not interchangeable indicators of an underlying disorder. Current research practices
lump individuals with very different problems into one category, which has contributed
to the remarkably slow progress in key research domains such as the development
of efficacious antidepressants or the identification of biomarkers for depression.
The recently proposed network framework offers an alternative to the problematic
assumptions. MD is not understood as a distinct condition, but as heterogeneous
symptom cluster that substantially overlaps with other syndromes such as anxiety
disorders. MD is not framed as an underlying disease with a number of equivalent
indicators, but as a network of symptoms that have direct causal influence on each
other: insomnia can cause fatigue which then triggers concentration and psychomotor
problems. This approach offers new opportunities for constructing an empirically based
classification system and has broad implications for future research.
Keywords: DSM, depression symptoms, essentialism, major depression, networks, nosology
Introduction
Major depression (MD) is a highly prevalent, impairing, recurrent, and often chronic disorder
(Solomon et al., 2000; Kessler et al., 2003, 2005; McClintock et al., 2010), and one of the most
pressing health-related problems of modern living. Despite decades of research, however, very basic
questions remain unresolved: genetic studies have been unable to identify loci reliably associated
with depression diagnosis (Lewis et al., 2010; Shi et al., 2011; Wray et al., 2012; Daly et al., 2013)
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or treatment response (Tansey et al., 2012), antidepressants do
not work above placebo level for the majority of patients (Khan
et al., 2002; Kirsch et al., 2008; Pigott et al., 2010), and the recently
published DSM-5 field trials have documented a “questionable”
reliability for depression diagnosis (Regier et al., 2013).
One of the main reasons for this striking lack of progress is
covert heterogeneity of depression: the current diagnostic crite-
ria and common research practices lump individuals suffering
from diverse psychiatric symptoms into one undifferentiated cat-
egory (Olbert et al., 2014; Zimmerman et al., 2014). To qualify
for a diagnosis of MD, individuals have to exhibit 5 or more
criterion symptoms, at least 1 of which has to be either ‘sad
mood’ or ‘loss of interest.’ A recent study identified 1030 unique
depression symptom profiles in 3703 individuals diagnosed with
MD, translating into only 3.6 patients per profile (Fried and
Nesse, 2015). The most common profile had a frequency of only
1.8 and 41.5% of the participants endorsed symptoms patterns
that were present only five times in the full sample. It has also
been shown that depression symptoms such as insomnia, fatigue,
sad mood, or concentration problems differ from each other in
important aspects. For instance, symptoms differ in their risk
factors (Lux and Kendler, 2010; Fried et al., 2014) and under-
lying biology (Hasler et al., 2004; Myung et al., 2012; Kendler
et al., 2013), exhibit variable impacts on impairment of psy-
chosocial functioning (Tweed, 1993; Faravelli et al., 1996; Fried
and Nesse, 2014), and particular adverse life events trigger spe-
cific symptom profiles (Keller and Nesse, 2006; Keller et al.,
2007).
This means that sum-scores obfuscate important differences
between symptoms on the one hand, and between individuals
on other hand. In this paper I aim to explain why sum-scores
are so prevalent in depression research, and elucidate two main
assumptions they are tacitly based on. I go on to show that
these assumptions contrast with evidence, and conclude with dis-
cussing an alternative network framework that accommodates
both the fuzzy nature of MD as well as the stark differences
between individual symptoms better than the current perspective.
The Current Depression Schema
Why is information about specific symptoms commonly disre-
garded in favor of unspecific sum-scores and diagnoses? Two
implicit assumptions of the currently dominating research frame-
work have encouraged the pervasive use of sum-scores. It is
important to point out that few researchers and even fewer
clinicians will defend these assumptions. In a sense, we as a com-
munity conduct research based on these assumptions, while most
individual researchers may not hold them. The goal here is not
to attack a straw man, but to explicate these problematic assump-
tions, and elucidate how deeply entrenched they are in everyday
research practices. Not only are they are reflected in how we think
about MD, but also in how we pose research questions, and in
the statistical models we use to answer such questions. Globally,
the assumptions have fostered and continue to foster simplistic
thinking about depression, and have greatly contributed to the
disappointingly slow progress in key research areas.
Depression as Distinct Disease Category
The first assumption is that depression constitutes a distinct
disease category, similar to medical conditions such as pneumo-
nia or myocardial infarction. Historically, the view of diseases
as specific entities was solidified by the discovery of causative
agents for infectious diseases. In 1905, the German microbi-
ologist Robert Koch won the Nobel Prize for identifying the
organisms that cause infectious diseases like anthrax and tuber-
culosis. The subsequent discovery of specific bacteria causing
other specific diseases, such as Treponema pallidum for syphilis,
consolidated the understanding of medical disorders as natural
kinds (Boyd, 1999; Zachar and Kendler, 2007; Kendler et al.,
2010). This perspective views diseases as unchanging and ahis-
torical entities with sharp boundaries accounted for by specific
causes. Diseases are defined by a specific set of properties (e.g.,
symptoms and duration) that are both necessary and sufficient
for a diagnosis. This particular way of classification is often
referred to as essentialism or kind essentialism (Wilson et al., 2007,
p. 3; Kendler et al., 2010), and an essence in this sense can be
defined as “some kind of underlying, intrinsic property, some-
thing that lies within kind members, making them the kind of
thing that they are.” All members of a kind have certain intrinsic
properties, and identifying these properties allows for a reliable
classification.
Chemical elements provide good examples for natural kinds:
gold has the atomic number 79, and everything with this atomic
number is gold. The internal structure itself defines kind mem-
bership, not a man-made classification system. Measles, on the
other hand, is an infection of the respiratory system caused by
a specific virus, and accompanied by various symptoms like red
eyes, fever, and a generalized rash. Moreover, many individu-
als suffering from measles exhibit a pathognomonic symptom
– Koplik’s spots inside the patient’s mouth – that allows for a
diagnosis beyond any reasonable doubt.
This disease model has been considered one of the most
important discoveries in medicine (Hyland, 2011), and has been
crucial in the development of efficacious treatments. The suc-
cessful treatment of tuberculosis requires at least three insights:
that tuberculosis is caused by a specific bacterial agent; that
the underlying disease causes particular symptoms, which in
turn indicate the presence of the latent disorder; and that
antibiotics are successful in the treatment of such a bacterial
infection.
The idea of diseases as natural kinds with discrete causes
also worked well for one of the first psychiatric diseases iden-
tified: general paresis, known at that time as general paralysis
of the insane. General paresis, a diverse set of neuropsychi-
atric symptoms, was described as early as 1822, but its cause
was not found until the beginning of the 20th century when
syphilitic bacteria were identified in the brains of deceased paret-
ics (Kendler et al., 2010). The model of specific diseases with
specific causes was soon generalized to the rest of medicine
including psychiatry. In 1912, the German psychiatrist Alfred
Roche stated that the “success achieved here has perhaps been
a misfortune in its side effects because it nourished the illu-
sion that something similar might soon be repeated” (Sass, 2007;
p. 139).
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The idea that mental disorders are distinct kinds that behave
similarly to other medical conditions has been present through-
out the history of psychiatry (Lilienfeld, 2014). For example,
Gerald Klerman put forward a summary of fundamental prin-
ciples of psychiatry in 1978 during his time as chief of the US
national mental health agency. Among other less controversial
points Klerman suggested that “there is a boundary between the
normal and the sick,” and that “there are discrete mental disor-
ders” (Klerman, 1978; for other prototypical examples, see: Guze,
1992; Andreasen, 2001). Especially the rise of biological psychia-
try fostered the notion of mental disorders as discrete conditions.
Once the DSM-III was established, clinical trials demanded strict
diagnostic criteria leading to homogeneous groups of patients,
with the aim of developing specific treatments for particular
disorders, and of finding specific underlying biological abnormal-
ities (Roth, 2001). Such beliefs in the categorical nature of mental
disorders are also reflected in more recent developments like the
DSM-5 (Lilienfeld, 2014).
The belief that mental disorders are discrete entities is preva-
lent among both laypeople and medical professionals (Haslam
and Ernst, 2002; Adriaens andDe Block, 2013). An implicit essen-
tialist worldview develops early in human cognition (Gelman,
2009) and applies to numerous domains of classification such as
chemical elements, species, and emotions (Haslam et al., 2000;
Prentice and Miller, 2007); there is a natural human tendency
to essentialize. However, categorical systems such as basic emo-
tions or mental disorders may often reflect this essentialist bias
and not necessarily reality (Allport, 1954; Zachar and Bartlett,
2002).
In depression research, dimensions are transformed into cat-
egories by setting threshold values for sum-scores of symptoms
which, if exceeded, assign individuals with diverse symptoms to
the category of MD. The search for potential causes then often
proceeds as if depression is a natural kind, similar to tuberculosis
– with disappointing results. We have failed to find depresso-
coccus, and the quest for biomarkers and more efficacious treat-
ment has been disappointing at best. This lack of progress is partly
because the definition of MD as disease entity has encouraged
lack of attention to specific symptoms (Persons, 1986; Costello,
1993; Parker, 2005) and their dynamic interactions (Borsboom
and Cramer, 2013).
Depression as Common Cause for its
Symptoms
The second assumption tacitly underlying the majority of mod-
ern depression research is that depression causes its symptoms,
an idea that also goes back to infectious diseases. A measles
infection causes measles symptoms, which is why these symp-
toms are measured to indicate the presence or absence of
measles. In the statistical literature, this is referred to as com-
mon cause framework (Cramer et al., 2010; Schmittmann et al.,
2013).
Within this framework, underlying concepts are described
as reflective latent variables. A latent variable is something that
cannot be observed directly; psychological constructs such as
intelligence and neuroticism are good examples. A latent vari-
able is reflective when the latent variable determines its indicators
FIGURE 1 | Visualization of a reflective latent variable model.
D indicates the latent disorder depression that is modeled as common cause
of the observable symptoms s1–s14.
(Bollen, 1989; Schmittmann et al., 2013; Figure 1). The person-
ality trait extraversion, for example, is viewed as the cause of a
person’s tendency to enjoy talking to strangers or attending social
events; this is why personality tests use these items to measure
extraversion. Extraversion is the common cause for extraverted
behavior, and we assess such behaviors as indicators of a person’s
position on the latent variable extraversion.
Medical disorders are also conceptualized within this frame-
work. When a patient complains about the symptoms polyuria
(frequent urination), polydipsia (increased thirst), and polypha-
gia (increased hunger), a doctor will conclude that the latent
disorder diabetes is the most probable common cause for
the symptoms. Symptoms are observable indicators that mea-
sure an underlying construct. Similarly, we use instruments
such as the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al.,
1961) or the Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (HRSD;
Hamilton, 1960) to query individuals about depressive symp-
tomatology to investigate the presence or absence of the under-
lying disease entity, and we model depression via reflective
latent variables in structural equation models such as factor
analytic techniques. These models describe a clear direction
of causation, and arrows always lead from depression to the
symptoms in visual representations of latent variable models
(Figure 1).
This common cause framework renders all symptoms roughly
equally central to a disorder, because all symptoms result from an
underlying condition; symptoms become diagnostically equiva-
lent and interchangeable (Cramer et al., 2010; Lux and Kendler,
2010; Schmittmann et al., 2013). And while the DSM features
are hierarchical structure with two core symptoms of which at
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least one must be present for a diagnosis, screening instruments
do not make this distinction. Overall, sum-scores can be natu-
rally accommodated within this framework of a common cause:
symptom number, not symptom nature matters. Consequently,
15 points on the BDI indicate a higher depression severity than
10 points. This is problematic for a variety of reasons: one exam-
ple is that symptoms differ from each other in their impact
on impairment of functioning (Tweed, 1993; Fried and Nesse,
2014).
Another consequence of the common cause framework is
that symptoms are considered locally independent (Holland and
Rosenbaum, 1986; Schmittmann et al., 2013). Depression symp-
toms tend to cluster, and patients often report a host of associated
symptoms such as insomnia, fatigue, appetite loss, sad mood,
and concentration problems. In reflective latent variable mod-
els, the reason for symptom covariation is the latent variable
itself. Imagine we measure a person’s weight (the latent variable)
on ten different scales (the tests), and find that the results are
highly correlated. In this case, the reason for the high correla-
tions is the latent variable itself, and controlling for the common
cause (weight) makes the correlations disappear. The correlations
are spurious. Likewise, depression symptoms in reflective latent
variable models are assumed to be uncorrelated beyond their
shared origin. While the common cause framework requires that
symptoms be locally independent, every clinician knows that this
requirement is implausible: insomnia may cause fatigue, which
in turn can trigger concentration problems and psychomotor
problems.
The idea of depression as common cause for its symptoms
is related to the notion of depression as a distinct disease.
Together, these assumptions have fostered a scientific frame-
work in which particular symptom information is ignored in
favor of unspecific sum-scores. Over a century after the dis-
covery of biological causes of general paresis, mental disorders
such as depression are understood to be natural kinds with
essences that fundamentally define them. This explains our quest
for biomarkers: if depression is a distinct disease entity, similar
to tuberculosis, we ought to find particular biological corre-
lates (e.g., in the brain) that cause depression symptoms. The
view is reflected in the recently announced commitment of the
NIMH to fund only research examining the neurobiological
roots of mental disorders in the current grant cycle (Reardon,
2014).
Disease Model and Reality:
Assumptions Contrast with Evidence
While the majority of depression research is implicitly based on
these two assumptions, a host of studies have documented that
they do not “fit the data.”
Depression as Natural Kind
The categorical view of depression as discrete disease is not
consistent with taxometric or psychometric data (Kendell and
Jablensky, 2003; Aggen et al., 2005; Slade and Andrews, 2005;
Ruscio et al., 2007; Markon et al., 2011). Depression symptoms
in general population samples do not form non-overlapping dis-
tributions for healthy and depressed individuals. This means that
there is a lack of a zone of rarity – depression is not a discrete
category like measles, but a dimension. Research on subthreshold
depression supports this view. The presence of fewer than five
DSM symptoms is often clinically significant, with depression-
like levels of functional impairment, psychiatric and physical
comorbidities, and increased risk of future depressive episodes
(Pincus et al., 1999; Solomon et al., 2001). While categorical
definitions may be necessary for practical purposes, they have
fostered reductionist thinking about depression. If we read and
talk about depression as one entity, misleading questions such as
“what causes it” and “what are genetic predispositions for it” arise,
further fortifying essentialist views.
We have also failed to identify pathognomonic biological
markers for depression. While the DSM-III (APA, 1980) pream-
ble, written in the spirit of biological psychiatry, predicted that
biomarkers reliably associated with most diagnoses would be
identified by the time the DSM-IV (APA, 1994) appeared, not a
single biological test was ready for inclusion in the DSM-5 over
three decades later (Kapur et al., 2012). Large genome-wide asso-
ciation studies have been unable to replicate genetic associations
with depression diagnosis (Lewis et al., 2010; Shi et al., 2011;
Wray et al., 2012; Daly et al., 2013) or treatment response (Tansey
et al., 2012), and in a recent study with over 34000 subjects,
no single locus reached genome-wide significance (Hek et al.,
2013).
The high comorbidity rates of depression with other disorders
such as generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) and posttraumatic
stress disorder (PTSD; Kessler et al., 2005) pose another problem
for the notion of discrete diseases. Depression is a fuzzy cate-
gory that substantially overlaps with various other syndromes.
Not surprisingly, associations of genetic markers with particu-
lar mental disorders are small at best, and often not specific to
one diagnosis (Kendler, 2005; Purcell et al., 2009). Moreover,
considerable genetic correlations among mental disorders have
been identified, for instance between MD and schizophrenia
(r = 0.43), and between MD and attention-deficit/hyperactivity
disorder (r = 0.32; Lee et al., 2013). Glutamate neurotrans-
mission provides another excellent example for transdiagnos-
tic similarities, and dysregulations have been implicated in the
etiology of depression (Sanacora et al., 2012), schizophrenia
(Schwartz et al., 2012), obsessive-compulsive disorder (Grados
et al., 2013), and anxiety disorders (Riaza Bermudo-Soriano et al.,
2012).
A further argument is that natural kinds are described by
properties that are both necessary and sufficient. Depression
is measured via rating scales such as the BDI or the HRSD
that differ substantially from each other – and from the DSM-
5 criteria – regarding the symptoms they assess depression
with. This dramatic heterogeneity of symptoms (Olbert et al.,
2014; Zimmerman et al., 2014; Fried and Nesse, 2015) is
hard to reconcile with the notion of a clearly defined essence
of MD.
Finally, biological systems are highly interdependent: genes
express proteins that work in cells that ultimately shape behav-
ior – and at most levels, regulatory feedback mechanisms with
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the environment exist. Declaring one of these processes to be
a fundamental part of the essence of a mental disorder is
arbitrary and ignores the complex nature and dynamic causal-
ity of biological systems (Zachar, 2002; Kendler and Baker,
2007).
Despite all the efforts, major discoveries validating psychi-
atric disease categories are absent. Due to this lack of validity,
critical voices have surfaced calling psychiatry a semi-science
(e.g., Brooks, 2013). The president of the American Psychiatric
Association, Jeffrey Lieberman, recently responded to such crit-
icism and stated that progress “has been largely limited by tech-
nology” (Lieberman, 2013). The human genome and brain are
highly complex, and identifying disturbed brain areas, dysfunc-
tional neurotransmitter systems, and risk alleles is a very difficult
matter – but ultimately a matter of time and technology. While
there is nothing wrong with the idea that psychological prob-
lems may have biological correlates – there is some evidence
that particular depression symptoms or syndromes are differ-
entially associated with biological markers (Myung et al., 2012;
Kendler et al., 2013) – it is noteworthy that the reason for the
current lack of progress is generally searched for in technologi-
cal areas. The disease model itself – our understanding of mental
disorders in general and depression in specific – remains largely
unquestioned.
Depression as Common Cause for its
Symptoms
There is also compelling evidence showing that the common
cause model and its consequences such as symptom equiva-
lence and local independence do not describe depression well. A
large number of studies have shown that depression symptoms
directly influence each other (e.g., Borsboom and Cramer, 2013;
Wichers, 2013; Bringmann et al., 2014). For instance, insomnia
can lead to other symptoms such as psychomotor and cognitive
impairment, fatigue, low mood, and suicidal ideation (Fawcett
et al., 1990; Pilcher and Huffcutt, 1996; Fairclough and Graham,
1999; Durmer and Dinges, 2005; Ferentinos et al., 2009; de
Wild-Hartmann et al., 2013), whereas hopelessness is a well-
established predictor for suicidal ideation (Beck et al., 1990;
Fawcett et al., 1990; Brown et al., 2000; Kuo et al., 2004). The idea
that symptoms form vicious circles and influence or maintain
each other is also well established in clinical theories (Beck et al.,
1979; Ma and Teasdale, 2004), and individuals often describe
their own symptoms as dynamic patterns (Frewen et al., 2012,
2013).
Furthermore, symptoms are not equivalent or interchange-
able, seeing that they differ in core aspects such as risk fac-
tors, precipitants, underlying biology, and impact on impairment
(Keller et al., 2007; Kendler et al., 2013; Fried and Nesse, 2014;
Fried et al., 2014). Life events like romantic loss or chronic stress
lead to different, particular symptom profiles (Keller et al., 2007),
and fatigue has different risk factors than, for example, suici-
dal ideation, making a common cause explanation implausible
(Fried et al., 2014). To my knowledge, three studies have aimed
to directly test the common cause model and found that alterna-
tive models described the data significantly better (Cramer et al.,
2013; Fried et al., 2014, 2015).
Problems Resulting from the Two
Assumptions
The tacit adherence to essentialism and the common cause model
may be at the very heart of many unsolved problems in depres-
sion research. The difficulty is not so much that all clinicians
and researchers actively hold this perspective – there are out-
spoken opponents of the disease model of natural kinds and
the common cause framework in psychology, psychiatry, and
philosophy (Zachar, 2002; Zachar and Kendler, 2007; Kendler
et al., 2010; Cramer et al., 2013; Schmittmann et al., 2013; it
is if of note that this critique is aimed at certain assumptions
about mental disorders, and thus differs entirely from crit-
ics that question the foundations of psychiatry as such (e.g.,
Szasz, 1974). The problem is that the assumptions are deeply
rooted in the history of medicine, are easy to understand and
intuitive, usually implicit, and thus reflected in many mod-
ern research practices (such as the use of sum-scores). As
stated above, the scientific community holds these views implic-
itly, whereas the majority of individual researchers may not.
These assumptions, however, have contributed to a host of
problems.
First, they have led us to think simplistically about depression,
and ignore important information only an analysis of individual
symptoms can provide (Persons, 1986; Costello, 1993; Fried et al.,
2014).
Second, the lack of homogeneity of the depressive syndrome
may help explaining the low reliability of depression diagnosis.
The DSM-5 field trials estimated the reliabilities of selected DSM-
5 diagnoses in large representative clinical populations (Regier
et al., 2013); reliability was assessed by measuring the degree
to which two clinicians independently agreed on the presence
or absence of psychiatric conditions. The trials yielded a “ques-
tionable” reliability of depression diagnosis of 0.28, indicating
a very low agreement. The degree of diagnostic certainty was
much lower for depression than for the majority of other dis-
orders such as borderline personality disorder (0.54) or PTSD
(0.67). David Kupfer, chair of the DSM-5 task force, had to
“acknowledge that the relatively low reliability of major depres-
sive disorder [. . .] is a concern for clinical decision-making”
(Kupfer, 2013).
Third, there is a lack of validity for depression diagnosis, a
problem that has received considerable attention in recent years.
In a review on the topic, Parker (2005) concluded that depres-
sion fails to meet orthodox criteria for validity such as a clear
clinical presentation, precise diagnostic boundaries, and treat-
ment specificity. Parker further documented that depression is
not a particularly useful label because it does not provide non-
trivial information about prognosis and treatment – prediction
about the future course of depression is only possible on the
level of the individual (e.g., age, gender, neuroticism), but not
based on the diagnosis itself. Parker’s views are widely shared.
For example, Thomas Insel, director of the NIMH, announced
shortly before the release of the DSM-5 that the NIMH would
no longer accept the DSM diagnostic criteria as gold standard
of psychiatric research due to their lack of validity (Insel, 2013),
and the introduction of a leading psychiatric textbook reads:
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“there is little reason to believe that these categories are valid”
(Grebb and Carlsen, 2009). The ‘Research Agenda for DSM-5′
(Kupfer et al., 2002) nicely summarizes different lines of evi-
dence for the lack of validity of diagnostic categories such as
the inability to validate them using biological tests, the high
comorbidity rates between mental disorders, the high degree
of temporal diagnostic instability, and the lack of treatment
specificity.
A symptom-Based Framework for
Studying Depression
If depression is not a consistent syndrome, if symptoms dif-
fer from each other in important aspects, and if sum-scores
obfuscate important information, how should we then under-
stand andmodel depression? A symptom-based framework offers
a viable alternative grounded in scientific realism instead of
problematic assumptions. This framework substitutes the two
assumptions discussed above – depression as natural kind, and
depression as common cause for its symptoms – with two new
perspectives.
Homeostatic Property Clusters
The ontological side of the framework – what is depression? –
replaces the notion of depression as bounded category. Instead,
depression is understood as a homeostatic property cluster (HPC;
Boyd, 1991, 1999; Ereshefsky, 2007; Wilson et al., 2007). The
idea of HPCs is best introduced using the example of biologi-
cal species. Assuming that species are discrete natural kinds with
clearly demarcated boundaries is pre-Darwinian – today we know
that variation and heterogeneity within a species is not a deviation
from the true essence of a biological kind, but part of what it is to
be a member of those kinds. The reason why genetic, behavioral,
and physiological properties of a specific species are contingently
clustered in nature is that the presence of one property tends to
favor the presence of another. This means that species are prop-
erty clusters that share related features due to the existence of
a multitude of underlying causal mechanisms lawfully connect-
ing these properties. We are inclined to describe HPCs as natural
kinds (Zachar and Bartlett, 2002), but since relationships between
properties are often probabilistic and not deterministic, imperfect
aggregations of properties exist, and most things may show some
but not all properties of a property family. The large majority of
individuals of any given species are more closely clustered on a
multidimensional space of properties than individuals of other
species. However, some clusters are closer together than others,
and many clusters may overlap partially.
Depression fits the description of a HPC (Kendler et al., 2010;
Borsboom and Cramer, 2013). MD is highly heterogeneous, not
everybody has all symptoms, and symptoms are associated law-
fully with each other due to complex mechanisms. As expected
from a property cluster, it is hard to draw a discrete bound-
ary between healthy and ill. The perspective explains the high
comorbidity rates of depression with other disorders like GAD
and PTSD. Traditional approaches suggest that mental disorders
are separate disease kinds, and individuals with comorbid disor-
ders suffer from two distinct conditions. This is explained by a
general susceptibility toward negative affect, or by shared genes
that predispose for both disorders (Mineka et al., 1998; Barlow
et al., 2004). From the perspective of HPCs, it is to be expected
that individuals in a property cluster A (e.g., MD) will often be
found in another cluster B (e.g., GAD) because the clusters share
defining properties. The DSM criteria for MD and GAD both
encompass ‘sleep problems,’ ‘fatigue,’ ‘concentration problems,’
and ‘psychomotor agitation,’ and MD and PTSD share the symp-
toms ‘loss of interest,’ ‘concentration problems,’ ‘sleep problems,’
‘low mood,’ and ‘self-blame.’ Syndromes substantially overlap,
and individuals with a certain set of symptoms will often be
described equally well by different diagnoses. This also explains
the problems in key research areas such as lack of efficacy of treat-
ment studies, the lack of biological markers for depression, and
the low reliability and validity of depression diagnosis: depres-
sion is an extraordinary fuzzy syndrome (Fried and Nesse, 2015),
and research based on arbitrary thresholds does not properly
acknowledge the pronounced heterogeneity ofMD and the lawful
connections among symptoms.
Depression as Symptom Network
Moving from the ontological to the statistical side of the frame-
work, the idea of depression as a network of causally related
symptoms that interact dynamically provides an alternative to
reflective latent variable models. Depression is not understood
as a latent disease entity; instead, it is constituted by causal
connections among symptoms (Borsboom and Cramer, 2013;
Schmittmann et al., 2013; van de Leemput et al., 2014). In other
words, symptoms do not cluster because of a shared origin – they
cluster because they trigger each other. This perspective naturally
accommodates findings such as differences among symptoms in
their risk factors and underlying biology, and networks do not
presuppose symptoms to be interchangeable or equivalent. The
framework also focuses on the causal autonomy of symptoms
instead of assuming that they are passive products of a common
cause: insomnia may lead to fatigue, which in turn can cause
concentration and psychomotor problems. Although a review of
the network literature is beyond the scope of this report (see
Borsboom and Cramer, 2013), I will list a number of recent illus-
trative network studies that have addressed important research
problems in different domains.
First, the framework is useful in comorbidity research, utiliz-
ing evidence that symptoms trigger other symptoms irrespective
of a given diagnosis. For instance, Cramer et al. (2010) have
shown that MD and GAD constitute two related psychopatho-
logical clusters that overlap considerably, which can be explained
by bridge symptoms such as ‘insomnia’ that connect the clusters.
Related work has shown that the DSM symptom network con-
forms to what can be called a small world structure: the DSM
features a host of interrelated symptoms, and symptoms are
strongly connected both within and across diagnoses. This means
that one can “travel” from any symptom to any other symptom in
just a few jumps (Borsboom et al., 2011; Goekoop and Goekoop,
2014), a perspective that offers new possibilities for comorbidity
research.
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Second, there is evidence that symptom networks vary as a
function of the type of life event experienced recently (Cramer
et al., 2013; Fried et al., 2015). For instance, the association
between the symptoms depressed mood and thoughts of death
was stronger in participants after a social conflict compared to
a group who had experienced a romantic loss. This is consistent
with previous work documenting that particular life events are
associated with specific symptom profiles (Keller et al., 2007), and
contrasts with the idea that all depression symptoms are prod-
ucts of one shared origin (and – in turn – with the notion that
the treatment of such a common cause will relieve all depression
symptoms).
Third, the network perspective allows for mutually reinforc-
ing symptoms and feedback cycles, a notion that has long been
acknowledged by clinicians (Beck et al., 1979; Ma and Teasdale,
2004). For example, worthlessness and guilt can form a vicious
circle in depressed patients, leading to a situation that is self-
sustaining and hard to escape (Bringmann et al., 2013). Such
reciprocal interactions are common in empirical psychopatho-
logical networks, but difficult to estimate in traditional structural
equation models that usually presuppose local independence
among symptoms (i.e., that symptoms are uncorrelated beyond
their common cause; see Schmittmann et al., 2013).
Fourth, network models can help identify the most causally
central symptoms – symptoms that trigger others across time –
which has important implications for prevention and interven-
tion research. A central symptom is one that is connected tomany
other symptoms in the network, whereas a peripheral symptom
features few or no connections. In a recent paper, Robinaugh
et al. (2014) used a network analysis to establish that symptoms
of persistent complex bereavement disorder (PCBD) form a syn-
drome that is related to, but somewhat distinct from a network
of depression symptoms. The symptom ‘emotional pain’ had the
highest centrality among individuals suffering from PCBD. This
means that endorsing emotional pain likely leads to the activation
of subsequent symptoms, and that the symptom deserves special
attention in the context of PCBD. Network-based centrality met-
rics (see Opsahl et al., 2010) thus offer insights different from the
investigation of symptom severity (there is not necessarily a rela-
tion between how severe a symptom is and how central it is in a
given network).
Fifth, novel statistical methods that closely follow participants
over time allow for constructing personal psychopathological
networks for each participant (Bringmann et al., 2013); this
means that the network framework allows for nomothetic anal-
yses on the group level as well as idiographic insights on the
person level. Person-centered networks may differ across indi-
viduals despite the same diagnosis, opening up a range of exciting
research opportunities. For instance, Kramer et al. (2014) recently
demonstrated that feedback on personalized patterns of affect sig-
nificantly reduces depressive symptoms compared to a control
group without feedback.
Sixth, the network framework may offer insights into the
problem of missing heritability: while depression seems to be at
least moderately heritable, the identification of specific genetic
markers has been difficult (Zuk et al., 2012). As recently docu-
mented for symptoms of psychosis (Smeets et al., 2014), certain
polymorphisms make individuals more vulnerable to develop
particular psychopathological symptoms in response to others.
For depression, there may be substantial variability in the way
people respond with fatigue to insomnia, or with suicidal ideation
to sad mood, because such pathways are likely moderated by the
genetic architecture. It is possible that large parts of the miss-
ing heritability are hidden in such symptom links, and future
genetic studies should examine individual symptoms as well as
their associations.
Finally, networks may offer a novel perspective on recurrence
and relapse of MD. There is evidence that not only the number
of symptoms predicts relapse, but that particular symptoms play
an especially important role. Residual anxiety and sleep prob-
lems independently predicted earlier MD recurrence in patients
who had previously remitted from depression (Dombrovski et al.,
2007), and understanding the causal mechanisms that underlie
residual symptoms may allow for developing prevention strate-
gies that specifically target populations at high risk for recurrence.
In summary, understanding depression symptoms as distinct
entities organized in webs of direct causal influences may facil-
itate progress in a large number of key research domains. This
is the case for both the group level as well as for the study
of idiographic aspects of depression. To contrast the common
cause model visualized in Figure 1, I constructed a longitudi-
nal symptom network to illustrate how such a network can look
like (Figure 2; not based on data; for empirical networks, see
Bringmann et al., 2014; Pe et al., 2014; Robinaugh et al., 2014). In
this exemplary network, especially symptoms s3, s11, and s12 are
closely interconnected and central – an intervention here would
likely stop the activation of subsequent symptoms. Other symp-
toms such as s2, s5, or s6, however, have few or no connections
FIGURE 2 | Visualization of a longitudinal psychopathological
symptom network. Longitudinal network model of the directed associations
between depression symptoms s1–s14 (not based on data). Self-loops
represent autoregressive effects, edges represent associations among
symptoms across time, and line-thickness indicates strength of the
associations. Symptoms with a large number of connections are displayed in
the center, symptoms with few or weak connections in the periphery.
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and may thus not be of great clinical importance. Furthermore,
s3 and s9 have reciprocal effects resembling a vicious circle, and
s2 and s6 have particularly strong autoregressive effects (self-
loops), implying that the presence of these symptoms in the near
future can be reliable predicted by their presence at the current
timepoint.
Two limitations of current network studies should also be
discussed briefly. First, while the majority of prior research has
focused on nomothetic aspects of networks, the degree of hetero-
geneity across participants remains largely unclear. For example,
feeling worthless may trigger feeling guilty in only half of a study
sample, whereas the opposite may be the case for the rest of
the participants; averaged group-level networks may not prop-
erly reflect such differences (Rosmalen et al., 2012). An important
step forward is to examine the heterogeneity of networks across
participants, which is possible with statistical tools like the mul-
tilevel vector autoregression model for experience sampling data
(Bringmann et al., 2013) that allow to construct idiographic net-
works and can derive measures of heterogeneity on the group
level. A related step is the development of mixture models that
detect subgroups of individuals with homogeneous networks.
A second challenge is the investigation of the statistical fit of
networks. Absolute and relative fit indices that are well estab-
lished in other fields (for an overview, see Hooper et al., 2008) are
not yet routinely implemented to determine the fit of network
models. This makes it difficult to examine how well a network
describes data, or to statistically compare different networks (e.g.,
two groups of healthy and depressed participants).
Due to the growing popularity of networks in the psychologi-
cal literature in recent years, they have become an active field of
development both in clinical-substantive (e.g., Hofmann, 2014)
as well as in the theoretical-psychometric research domains (e.g.,
van Borkulo et al., 2014). Ultimately, the question whether the
network framework can be considered a successful enterprise will
depend on the insights it provides as a model for depression. If
the centrality of a given MD symptom, the density of a depres-
sion network, or the way specific emotions shape others over
time allow us to predict important clinical variables such as the
increase in depressive symptomatology, treatment outcome, or
relapse, the notion of depression as a dynamical system deserves
a place among other more established theories.
Conclusion
While psychiatric diagnoses are necessary for standardizing
research and treatment, the last decades have not brought
substantial progress toward validating diagnostic categories,
and identifying clearly demarcated boundaries between diseases
remains difficult. In this paper I suggest a solution that consists
of two steps. First, it is important to acknowledge that many
research practices are based on two problematic assumptions –
that depression is a discrete disease category, and that depres-
sion causes its symptoms. A second step forward is to identify
a suitable alternative disease model that is based on more realistic
assumptions, and I believe that the network approach may be a
good candidate.
Depression is not a natural kind – it is a fuzzy and hetero-
geneous disease. But the most important feature of a diagno-
sis is not that it exists outside human classification systems as
real entity (Fine, 1984); above all, a diagnosis should be useful
(Zachar, 2002; Parker, 2005; Kendler et al., 2010). And a diag-
nosis is useful if it provides clinical utility, as suggested by the
DSM (APA, 2013; p.20): “it should help clinicians to determine
prognosis, treatment plans, and potential treatment outcomes
for their patients.” In other words, a diagnosis should make
predictions about etiology, disease onset, course of illness, and
recurrence, and thus allow for the development of efficacious pre-
vention and treatment strategies. Important features of a useful
diagnosis are a small number of symptoms specific to the dis-
ease (symptomatic homogeneity) along with a few strong risk
factors (etiological homogeneity). A disorder with a homoge-
neous pool of pathognomonic symptoms allows for a reliable
diagnosis. It increases the probability to discover distinct patho-
physiological processes, and enables researchers and clinicians
to develop and implement more specific and well-directed treat-
ment strategies. A disorder with a clearly circumscribed etiology,
on the other hand, makes early detection and prevention eas-
ier. Depression is highly heterogeneous on both dimensions: it
is associated with a large number of symptoms, and countless
pathways can lead to an episode of MD. If we additionally con-
sider the low reliability, low validity, and high comorbidity rates
of depression, it is fair to ask whether MD is a particularly useful
diagnosis.
Adopting a novel network research framework may allow for
substantial progress. This network approach focuses on smaller
and more valid and reliable units of observation – symptoms –
that are likely associated with more distinct underlying patho-
physiological processes. The framework not only acknowledges
the highly heterogeneous nature of MD, its complexity, and its
fuzzy boundaries, it also puts the focus on the dynamic inter-
actions among symptoms that have received comparably little
attention. The investigation of the differences between symptoms
in terms of risk factors or biomarkers, as well as their causal path-
ways may be a great opportunity. In addition, future network
studies could reveal that variables such as life stress, personality
traits, and pathophysiology moderate specific symptom path-
ways: some individuals may be especially vulnerable to develop
fatigue in response to insomnia, depending on their life situation
or genetic background.
Ultimately, insights gained through this symptom-based
approach may enable us to better describe several more valid
and reliable depressions as related property clusters of associ-
ated symptoms in the DSM-6. The network framework thus offers
novel perspectives for constructing an empirically derived classi-
fication system inwhich psychological and biological perspectives
are no longer competing, but complementing aspects.
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